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This study analyzes the Soviet politics of silence during Stalin’s collectivization campaign in the
context of peasant resistance, state violence, and the famine in 1928–1929, and illuminates the
primary function of strategic silence—an information blockade which creates a space for violence
and human suffering. Only in silence does the landscape of violence emerge and its spiral dynamics
consume everyone, assailants and victims, proceeding swiftly to the eventual destruction of this
landscape. In Ukraine, strategic silence and the relatively hermetic information blockade highlights
the intentional nature of state violence: it produced a ghetto of exclusion that helped crush peasant
resistance to collectivization and prevented Ukraine’s potential secession from the Union. More
profoundly, the politics of silence is analyzed as ‘‘cultural’’ violence and one of the most important
building blocks in the foundation of genocide that routinely provokes and escalates direct violence, a
phenomenon which culminates in massacres, repressions, and famines, as happened in the Ukrainian
case.
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The discovery of an important archival document about the Soviet past has always been
an event celebrated by historians. New ﬁndings help us construct a more nuanced
picture of the past, contextualize the existing knowledge about historical events, and
add conceptual clarity to this knowledge. In the case of the Holodomor,1 it is even
more so because the Soviet politics of silence systematically attempted to erase the
narrative about mass killings by hunger from Soviet history books, textbooks, and thus
from the national memory of several generations of people in Ukraine and the USSR.2
In the past 30 years, new archival studies allowed historians to speak of the cluster
of Soviet famines in Ukraine during the collectivization campaign of 1928–1933 and
analyze their man-made nature. Starvation was used as a political tool to tame the
Ukrainian peasantry, and to prevent the crystallization of the Ukrainian nation and
the consolidation of a competing power center in Ukraine.3 For example, the declassiﬁ-
cation of documents in 2006 located in the former KGB archive in Kyiv (HDA SBU)—
chekist directives, reports about the situation in the Ukrainian countryside, statistics,
diaries, and memoirs—served as the evidential base for a variety of analyses about the
dynamics, the scale, and the instrumentality of the famine in suppressing the Ukrainian
peasantry who rebelled against state violence in the late 1920s.4
Importantly, these documents, as many others, conﬁrmed the relevance and accuracy
of James Mace’s observations and research that he conducted before the Soviet archives
opened their doors to researchers.5 Mace’s provisions and conclusions that appeared
in the US Commission’s Report to Congress in April 1988 and spelled out the genocidal
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thesis of the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933 offered conceptual clarity to the matter
concealed by the Soviet regime for decades and identiﬁed research agenda for sub-
sequent generations of scholars. His deﬁnitions of intent and the methods through
which Moscow eliminated the nationally-oriented and most conscious Ukrainian segment
of society are still valid, and current studies on the Holodomor add incremental, yet
enormously important, nuances to his original interpretation.
Although a breakthrough and radical change in the way we think about historical
events are critically important, the power of incremental change and additions to the
master narrative occurring through systematic research and a discovery of new archival
documents should not be underestimated. The general story of the Holodomor, the
preceding famines, and those that followed the Holodomor has been told. Yet a general
scholarly consensus about the intentionality and the uniqueness of the Ukrainian
famine of 1932–1933 did not emerge until a great many studies offered sufﬁcient
archival evidence. Due to the efforts of many historians, incremental change and adjust-
ment of the historical record of Ukrainian famines led to a ‘‘tipping point’’ (Malcolm
Gladwell’s term) or to a ‘‘paradigm shift’’ (Thomas Kuhn’s term) when it became ex-
tremely difﬁcult to move forward with the thesis of commonality between the Holodomor
and other Soviet famines.6 Conceptually, three major intrinsically interconnected factors
contribute to the uniqueness of the Holodomor: time, space and place, and an un-
precedented number of deaths caused by starvation that occurred within a brief period
of time in Ukrainian territories.7 Starvation was clearly a political tool for Stalin, but
what makes this argument even more convincing is the politics of silence which was
advanced in late 1928 and which created the possibilities for escalating violence and
crushing peasant resistance to collectivization.
The discovery of the 1928 archival document, Circular no. 984, which was issued
by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow (Narkomindel) and explic-
itly ordered the Ukrainian authorities to deny any information or assistance to foreign
guests and journalists in traveling to the countryside, helps illustrate this point.8 In con-
junction with another important document received by Ukrainian leaders, the 1928
Statute about Secrecy which was issued by the secret police administration in Moscow
and helped to narrow the circle of individuals who could potentially have access to such
top secret documents, the Circular reveals the ultimate rationale for and meaning of
concealment of the extraordinary measures, a euphemism for violence through which
grain procurements were conducted by the state.
Most importantly, beyond concealing coercion and hiding its consequences, starva-
tion, impoverishment, and the Ukrainian peasants’ resistance and hostility toward Soviet
power, this document illuminates the essence of strategic silence (polityka zamovchu-
vannia in Ukrainian) which served as a tool of demarcation and isolation of the Ukrainian
peasantry and prepared the grounds for escalating violence in 1932–1933. Strategic silence
is one of the most important building blocks in the foundation of genocide, no matter
how it is achieved, through starvation or massacre. In isolation resistance is always
difﬁcult and slavery is always easy, as one intellectual has stated. The evidence and
literature that have been discussed in this text support exactly this conclusion. Only
in silence does the landscape of violence emerge, and its spiral dynamics consume
everyone, assailants and victims, proceeding swiftly to the eventual destruction of this
landscape.9 We have seen what was left of it in 1932–1933, a Kafkian blank, lifeless,
and frozen space.
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In order to contextualize this archival document, its analysis will be preceded by
three sections that will brieﬂy analyze the notion of silence as ‘‘cultural’’ violence, clarify
the mode of secrecy which helped promote violence, and offer a brief historical back-
ground illuminating the Soviets’ efforts to collectivize the Ukrainian peasantry in 1928–
1929.
Silence as Cultural Violence
To begin, what meanings did the Soviet politics of silence convey? Cheryl Glenn has
persuasively shown that there are numerous meanings and deﬁnitions of silence and
silencing.10 Silence means both a state of nature (the absence of sound or noise) and a
social phenomenon that exists when humans do not communicate. The reasons for
people’s silence may vary: they want to be silent, they need to be silent, or they are
forced to be silent.11 Importantly, John Gerring and Alexander J. Motyl remind us
that all deﬁnitions are imprecise and imperfect.12 The deﬁnitions of silence are no
exception. For the sake of conceptual clarity, silence is used here as ‘‘political strategic
silence’’ used by the state as an intentional tool for the concealment of realities.13 The
politics of silence and withholding information are critical elements of authoritarian
regimes. Beyond other functions, they help conceal the truth about violence and atrocities
committed by the state. Political strategic silence and the pandemic secrecy associated
with it shape the history and the aesthetics of state political practices,14 and through
their analysis we can better understand the modes of thinking and motivations of state
leaders, and the roots of state violence.
The strategic goal of silence in a place like the Soviet Union was the distortion
of realities by concealing or withdrawing information about people’s experiences and
state practices at a given time and in a speciﬁc location. The alteration of people’s con-
sciousness and perceptions (whether they were insiders or outsiders) about the socialist
paradise was a constant hope of Soviet leaders throughout the history of the USSR. To
legitimize the existence of this paradise, they engaged in sanitizing realities so that they
seemed better than they were. Marginalization, demarcation, and isolation were used
to cope with those who resisted the deception and actions associated with abuse and
violence.
Accordingly, silence in the Soviet case is meant to be understood as the ‘‘violent
silence imposed on the experiences of others’’15 and as a tool of violence, practices that
Johan Galtung has identiﬁed as ‘‘cultural or symbolic violence.’’ Typically, cultural
violence is employed to rationalize and defend the other two types of violence, deﬁned
by Galtung as ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘structural’’ violence.16 Galtung’s cultural violence seems
to be consistent with the notion of ‘‘systemic violence,’’ introduced by Slavoj Zizek, a
phenomenon that is less perceptible than direct violence. Pierre Bourdieu referred to
this type of violence as ‘‘symbolic’’ violence.17 Cultural violence, however, is a more
fundamental, pervasive, and long-lasting form of violence than ‘‘direct’’ violence, because
it is inscribed into our language and everyday practices, thus smoothing the functioning
of political systems, a notion that perfectly describes and explicates the Ukrainian case in
question. The creation of conditions for manipulation through language and hate speech
aimed at ‘‘enemies,’’ for instance, serve as examples of cultural violence, whose ultimate
goal is to exert control and to manage the situation. Glenn has noted that
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silence originates with the dominant party, stimulating the subordinate party to explore
options for breaking the silence, for rousing speech from the other . . . . To maintain
control of the situation, the dominant party must wield silence as a means to press the
subordinate into taking on the burden of silence . . . .18
Consequently, Soviet strategic silence is discussed here as a political tool that perpetuated
state violence and its consequences (people’s starvation and physical and psychological
suffering) by demarcating and isolating them as a group who remained unspoken and
unheard by a broader international community. The British scholar Ken Booth has main-
tained that all silences are ‘‘against some body or against some thing. . . . Such silences are
not natural, they are political.’’19 By not letting foreign and independent observers visit
the Ukrainian countryside, which in 1928 was rampant with starvation and at war with
the regime, the Soviet government considerably limited the peasants’ chance to be heard
and helped. In other words, they were prevented from becoming citizens worthy of con-
sideration, empathy, assistance, or protection—they were politically silenced and thus
excluded. The politics of silence in Soviet Ukraine gains an especially sinister meaning
when considered in the context of oral histories that illuminate state brutality and people’s
suffering as a result of starvation and psychological abuse.
To promote the state’s interests, the politics of silence was allotted a special place
in the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks did not invent this tool of control, but as the Soviet
regime and its key agency, the secret police, matured, the politics of silence was reﬁned
and advanced.20 Its essence was rather simple: in the hands of empowered party leaders,
silence prevented the witnessing of state violence and non-democratic methods of
governing, thereafter eliminating possibilities of critical observation and distribution
of information. Signiﬁcantly, silence often prevented ordinary people from detecting
deception and state violence. Charles de Gaulle once stated that silence served as the
ultimate weapon of power and control. Similarly, Ievgenii Ievtushenko has observed
that when truth was replaced by silence in the Soviet Union, the silence became a lie.
As mentioned earlier, cultural violence prepares the grounds for direct violence
and facilitates its daily escalation. Ultimately, as practice has shown, cultural violence
produces hidden or forgotten genocides,21 such as the Holodomor. Scholars often iden-
tify the Ukrainian famine as ‘‘the hidden famine of 1932–1933.’’22 A famine that cannot
be discussed simply does not exist, as Robert Kindler has stated.23 Yet many commen-
tators have noted that it was not silence, but ‘‘actual denial by the Soviet authorities’’
and the subsequent cover up that elevated the famine to a dominant position in Ukrainian
national history and cultural identity.24 The Soviet government considered any mention
of famine as anti-Soviet propaganda,25 and even after the threat of direct violence was
removed, the principle of cultural violence was at work, hijacking popular memory and
‘‘depriving the large majority of people of any meaningful cognitive mapping.’’26
For some, the continuity of Soviet politics in Ukraine and a direct connection
between the politics of silence advanced in 1928 and the genocide of 1932–1933 might
seem illusory. Sceptics might also suggest that the notion of continuity applied to the
Soviet regime is also illusory. Indeed, continuity can be more accurately measured and
perceived in electronics by using the continuity test to check an electric circuit and
to see whether current ﬂows. Nevertheless, in social science and historical dialectics,
continuity can be identiﬁed by analyzing its alternative—discontinuity.27 Was discon-
tinuity an intrinsic feature of the Soviet regime? Slavoj Zizek has suggested that it was
6 2018 Genocide Studies International 11, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsi.11.1.02
Starvation and Violence amid the Soviet Politics of Silence 41
(V9 20/9/17 18:09) UTP (6"9") MinionPro pp. 38–67 1864 GSI 11.1_02_Bertelsen (p. 41)
extremely consistent in its inconsistencies and its radical self-contradiction. The regime
constantly murdered itself through terror and repression. The escalation of violence
and constant purges were necessary not only ‘‘to erase the traces of the authentic revo-
lutionary past’’ of the regime but they were also a reminder of the betrayal of the
Revolution.28 The continuity and logic of the regime’s history, Zizek has argued, are in
its violent policies and purges—the ‘‘very form in which the betrayed revolutionary
heritage survives and haunts the regime.’’29 In this logic, the politics of silence served
multiple purposes. Among others, it helped mask the regime’s impotence, suicide, and
murder altogether.
Masking and silence were animated by secrecy, the hallmark of the Soviet state.
Secrecy
Secrecy commonly emerges and develops during the establishment of new states when
international skepticism about their legitimacy is most pronounced. In the Soviet Union
from its inception, secrecy accompanied state violence. The Red Terror institutionalized
by the Bolsheviks in 1918 seemed to them the only solution for suppressing competing
parties, kurkul revolts, and dissenters.30 A legal and institutional basis for terror was
needed to justify the almost unrestricted power of the secret police.31 However, despite
the terror’s legal status, executions and violent grain requisitions from ‘‘saboteurs’’ were
conducted as secret operations and were treated as such in the Cheka32 and party
documentation. In 1918–1919 the center (the Kremlin) introduced full-scale state terror
to ﬁght the peasants who were labeled as internal enemies, and subsequently Moscow
continued to utilize secrecy to prevent international exposure.
Spy hysteria and the threat of war motivated the government to design a set
of norms that all governmental agencies had to follow in order to prevent leaks of
any information that might be used by internal and external enemies. As Niels Erik
Rosenfeldt has pointed out, ‘‘external and internal enemies and their mutual scheming
constituted one of the most prominent themes in the Bolsheviks’ political philosophy,’’
and secretiveness was ‘‘gradually developed into pure obsession,’’ which incited the
agencies to classify any information, even the most innocent.33
The code of conspiratorial behavior was prescribed in detail in various instructions
issued by the party and reproduced in tens of thousands of copies that were distributed
among various governmental ofﬁces and organizations. These brochures were routinely
edited and issued almost every two years beginning in 1922. Materials considered top
secret were ‘‘reduced to a minimum,’’34 while the circulation of secret instructions
about the eligibility of those who might read these materials reached thousands of
copies. The thorough and detailed pattern of regulations was characteristic of the Soviet
bureaucratic system, and each rule was elaborated, clariﬁed, and often altered in sub-
sequent editions exhibiting the strict secret procedure that Soviet bureaucrats had to
follow in the localities.35 Ironically, various instructions and regulations about matters
of secrecy were of course secret, and a special secret procedure was to be followed
to review them to keep up with the injunctions that emanated from the Kremlin. The
rotation of those who had access to secret documents was constant, and often indi-
viduals who ﬁnally passed a routine secret background check for eligibility to read
secret materials were dismissed from their positions before they had an opportunity to
study the conglomeration of secret instructions. Instead of their status as ‘‘authorized
persons’’ determined through training and exhaustive GPU checks, they immediately
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acquired the status of ‘‘unauthorized persons’’ that was fraught with repression. Because
of Soviet personnel policies, it was extraordinarily difﬁcult for state bureaucrats to
become experts in conspiratorial practices, to be deemed senior members of the secret
apparatus, or to pass their experience to newcomers. In a sense, everyone was a new-
comer, and the state preferred to keep it this way.
The GPU was intimately involved in the process of screening ‘‘specialists’’ in secret
departments, and clandestinely gathered information about their personalities, habits,
social and political behavior. The agency valued any information, no matter how it
was obtained, especially that which negatively characterized an individual. The veriﬁca-
tion procedure of this information was generally poor. Positive evaluations were fre-
quently ignored and were considered not worth mentioning. For the GPU, information
became a commodity that could be used for the beneﬁt of or against rivals or friends,
supervisors or subordinates, strangers or relatives, political opponents or associates,
women or men, children or adults. Information could be bought, sold, obtained in
return for future favors, stolen and fabricated, but it could not be given away. The
motto of the agency was: ‘‘We are not an agency for inquiries. We receive information,
we do not give it away.’’36
In an atmosphere of paranoiac secrecy, in 1927 the center ordered the return of all
top secret documentation to Moscow after their careful scrutiny by the local authorities,
and no copies were allowed to be kept in regional agencies or archives. Subsequently,
the purges of national archives became a routine practice, resulting in displaced ofﬁcial
records and the disrupted integrity of archival collections ( fondy) in Ukraine.37 In light
of these realities, the discovery of the 11 December 1928 top secret Circular no. 984
in the State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast, a document that emanated from the People’s
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, came as a surprise.
There might be several reasons for its survival. Three waves of purges of Ukrainian
archives destroyed thousands of documents. The ﬁrst massive destruction of archival
documents associated with Soviet collectivization policies occurred in 1929–1930.
Apparently, documents dated earlier than 1 January 1929 may not have been allocated
for destruction.38 Or, for some unknown reason these documents were never returned
to Moscow, as was prescribed. It seems rather unusual that the recipient kept the
Circular issued by the Narkomindel despite the center’s 1927 resolution about the
mandatory return of conspiratorial documents, especially those issued by agencies
such as the Narkomindel and the secret police.39 The explanation might be found
in growing manifestations of sloppiness that became increasingly common among the
members of secret departments and authorized personnel, a phenomenon that was
contingent upon the amount of work which the agents were assigned and on the
general growth in secrecy and secret instructions that overwhelmed bureaucrats in the
localities. An alternative explanation might be informed by the document of the Secret
Bureau of the Kharkiv Okruha Executive Committee (Okrvykonkom) discovered in the
State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast.40 In the late 1920s there was a deﬁcit of sealing wax
typically used for secret correspondence. Therefore, there might have been delays in
mailing correspondence or negligence in following through with responses.41 The sub-
stantial rotation of the cadres in 1928–1929 might have contributed to the confusion
and chaos in paper work. Regardless of how this document slipped through archival
cleansing operations, its existence sheds light on the politics of silence which helped
obscure the dynamics of collectivization and the 1928–1929 famine for foreign observers.
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A brief historical background will clarify this point and explicate the Soviets’ pressing
need for the obfuscation of the situation in Ukraine.
Peasant Resistance and State Violence in Ukrainian Villages
As many scholars have demonstrated, ‘‘leader-centered regimes are . . . brittle,’’42 and
hyper-centralization is fraught with political crises, such as insurrections, rebellions,
and revolutions. The consolidation of Stalin’s power in 1928–1929 and state violence
led to exactly this result. Unbearable taxation and grain procurements plans, im-
poverishment, disfranchisement, cultural disruption, starvation, and social uncertainties
placed the majority of the Ukrainian peasantry in opposition to the Soviet regime in the
1928–1930.
According to the GPU, leaﬂets that had been distributed in the countryside by an
unknown group of conspirators from Kyiv became a widespread phenomenon in all
Ukrainian okruhy in 1926. The leaﬂets called for the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet
Peasant Republic that would unite the Ukrainian peasantry against the draconian eco-
nomic measures employed by the state.43 This propaganda, the GPU claimed, was very
effective, and peasants discussed the creation of unions to resist Soviet power that had
deceived them. The secret police registered 23 cases of active resistance and anti-Soviet
propaganda in the countryside in 1926: ‘‘Soviet power is the power of a gang of criminals,’’
stated a peasant.44
The disrespect seems to be mutual. For Stalin, the peasants were backward, reac-
tionary, and ‘‘not socialistic by their position.’’45 In his 1926 work Problems of Leninism,
dedicated to the Leningrad Organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
which was purged during the Great Terror, Stalin explained his perception of what the
peasantry should generally want:
Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. As far as the overwhelming majority of the
peasant farms is concerned, peasant economy is petty commodity economy. And what
is petty commodity peasant economy? It is an economy standing at the cross roads
between capitalism and socialism. It may develop in the direction of capitalism, as is
now happening in capitalist countries; or it may develop in the direction of socialism
as should happen here in our country under the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . .
Because our Party was able to discover to what extent the speciﬁc interests of the peasantry
(the overthrow of the landlords, peace) could be joined with and subordinated to the
general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the proletariat) which proved
acceptable and advantageous to the peasants. And so the peasants, at that time, in spite
of their being non-socialistic, followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.46
Stalin continued:
The same must be said about socialist construction in our country, about drawing the
peasantry into the stream of this construction. The peasantry are not socialistic by their
position. But the peasants must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist develop-
ment, for there is no other way nor can there be any other way of saving them from
poverty and ruin than the bond with the proletariat, by the bond with socialist industry,
than by including peasant economy in the general stream of socialist development, by
the widespread organization of the peasant masses in cooperative societies.47
On these two pages Stalin repeated the word ‘‘advantageous’’ three times, yet beyond
the point that the peasants would be enlisted in ‘‘the work of socialist construction’’ and
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would be drawn into ‘‘co-operative organization,’’ Stalin provided no explanation about
how this plan would be implemented and what concrete advantages the peasants could
expect as a result of this plan. Instead, the emphasis focused on the shortsightedness of
opposition within the party. In Stalin’s view, it did not ‘‘understand the inevitability of
this path [for the peasantry] under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.’’48
The decision to launch a new collectivization campaign was initially publicly denied
by Stalin. In 1926 he created a commission within the Politburo of the Central Com-
mittee VKP(b), which on 30 December 1926 prepared a resolution ‘‘About the Results
of Collective (radhosp and kolhosp) Construction.’’ In 1927, however, at meetings with
foreign workers’ delegations that arrived in Moscow on the eve of the 10-year anniver-
sary of the October revolution, Stalin refuted the ‘‘rumor’’ of the state’s intention to
collectivize the peasantry. Following Lenin’s thesis of ‘‘cooperative socialism,’’ Stalin
emphasized the voluntary nature of the cooperative movement and the engagement
of broad strata of individual peasant households in it. He rejected all-embracing collec-
tivization as an ineffective method which contradicted the interests of the peasants.
A few weeks after Stalin’s speeches before the foreign workers, the implementation of
‘‘all-embracing collectivization’’ began.49
In late 1927, the artiﬁcially created imbalance between the prices of manufactured
goods and agricultural products discouraged peasants from selling bread to the state.
State granaries were immediately emptied. Forcing the peasants to sell their grain, or
giving it to the state on the state’s conditions, seemed like a reasonable solution to
Stalin.50
The mechanisms of pressure differed. Among others, disfranchisement of the
peasants (pozbavlennia vyborchykh prav) and ﬁscal mechanisms of control were rather
effective. In 1928, the slightest expressions of displeasure with Soviet policies or practic-
ing entrepreneurial activities (selling a surplus of grain for cash) were identiﬁed as anti-
Soviet propaganda and speculation, and were severely punished.51 For example, during
the election campaign of 1928–1929, there were 869,111 people in the UkrSSR who
were deprived of voting rights, which constituted approximately 6% of all voters.52
To pursue industrialization and militarization projects and to preserve state power,
state ownership, and party control, a system of coercion and exaction in the form of
unbearable taxes was installed.53 Whatever the key objectives were at a given time, the
1919–1920 assault on the peasantry served as the experiential foundation for further
enforcement of draconian taxation policies. The zigzag-like maneuvers of the state
during the 1920s, concessions to the peasants and again full state control over them,
ceased in 1926 when the state consolidated its power and taxed peasants heavily for
failing to be active members of the new Communist reality, swiftly approaching the
Great Turn of 1929.54
The Bolsheviks taxed peasants’ income, and all they needed was information about
the peasants’ households, land, animals, potential income, and the like, which allowed
the authorities to evaluate peasant capacities.55 These assessments were inaccurate and
often driven by personal and ideological biases. There was a ‘‘growing concern that the
peasants were poorly integrated and contributing too little to the new regime.’’56 The
agricultural tax was ‘‘ﬂat and apportioned,’’ and could be increased for the needs of
industrialization arbitrarily, as happened in 1928 in Ukraine on the eve of the new
Five-Year Plan (1928–1932).57 The tax was so high that peasants ﬂooded the district tax
ofﬁces with petitions asking to reduce their tax because they could not pay it.58 Private
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households paid twice as much tax as collectivized households, those that were coerced
into joining collective farms.59 Most petitions were written by poor peasants who
claimed that they had no property, and rented apartments in residential buildings that
belonged to the Soviets. Many petitioners were denied assistance, unless they were
servicemen, soldiers in the Red Army or relatives of servicemen.60
The new course of collectivization in 1928,61 unbearable agricultural taxation,
religious persecution, bad weather conditions, starvation, diseases, and an increasing
scale of terror against peasants exacerbated their suffering and provoked ﬁerce passive
and active resistance to coercion and Soviet collectivization policies: ‘‘violence fed on
violence, state terror provoked and reacted to anti-violence,’’ complicating Stalin’s task
to mobilize the funds for the Five-Year Plan.62 Growing anti-collectivization protests in
Ukraine presented an existential threat to the Soviet regime and its survival. To remove
the obstacle, Stalin had to bastardize the behavior of the wealthiest part of the peasantry
and dehumanize the enemies of Soviet power, justiﬁcations for a cascade of cleansing
operations that followed.
Almost a decade after Soviet power was established in Ukraine, the threat of
Ukraine’s secession seemed to be serious and real. Moreover, the state perceived that
this threat was of a magnitude that required extraordinary measures, when normal
everyday rules and codes of behavior had to be suspended. A sharp turn toward repres-
sion in the middle of 1928 is not surprising, because in June 1928, Vsevolod Balyts’kyi,
head of the GPU in Ukraine, sent a report to Lazar Kaganovich, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, about the escalating activities of Ukrainian
counterrevolutionaries’ and kurkuli of all kinds, who, according to Balyts’kyi, hoped
that the days of the USSR were numbered, a war with the West was inevitable, and
Ukraine could gain independence.63 In light of the preceding 1926 report ‘‘On Ukrai-
nian separatism,’’ Kaganovich and Stalin understood this document as a signal to
centralize power, to eliminate the threat emanating from the Ukrainian countryside,
and to intensify propaganda for collectivization.64 The peasant and the Ukrainian ques-
tions overlapped, and they needed a more fundamental hands-on rule, preferably by
one person, to be solved.
After the failure to collect sufﬁcient grain supplies in 1927, Stalin persistently returned
to discussions about a necessary shift in Soviet agricultural policies and advocated the
introduction of extraordinary measures to combat the kurkuli and to conduct effective
grain procurements. Yet he was extremely cautious in asserting himself as the leader of
the Central Committee. His opponents were other prominent party members Aleksei
Rykov, Nikolai Bukharin, Mikhail Tomsky, Mikhail Kalinin, and Nikolai Uglanov who
supported the principles of collective leadership in the Central Committee, and opposed
the rise of Stalin and the extreme measures and violence he advocated.65
Stalin’s trip to Siberia in mid-January 1928 solidiﬁed his position. According to
several scholars, it was strategic for personal and political reasons.66 According to Oleg
Khlevniuk, Stalin was eager to demonstrate that he was capable of solving grain and
other crises in the country on his own. The effectiveness of extreme measures which
always remained an option for Stalin could kill two birds with one stone: he could
defeat his impotent opposition who failed to deliver sufﬁcient grain to the state in
1927, and legitimize his exclusive and leading position in the Politburo, if the terror in
Siberia succeeded.67 And it did.
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Stalin’s superb skills at manipulation, blackmail, and scheming, and his ties to the
GPU that was under his control helped him discredit his opponents, and he moved for-
ward with the plan of extraordinary measures in Ukraine.68 Even before his departure
to Siberia (he left on 15 January 1928), on 5 January 1928, the Ukrainian party organs
received a new document from the Central Committee of the VKP(b) signed by Stalin,
the directive ‘‘To Party Organizations about Bread Procurement’’ which encouraged the
local authorities to employ the severest measures of punishment and repressive meth-
ods to those who sabotaged the collection of grain and taxes.69 Rightfully calculating
and anticipating glorious success in Siberia, Stalin signed and sent another document
to the party leadership in Ukraine, the 14 January 1928 directive, ‘‘About the Intensiﬁ-
cation of the Measures to Procure Bread.’’ The extreme measures spelled out in the
directive and to be applied to the ‘‘recalcitrant’’ in the countryside further dramatized
the events of 1928–1929.70
The War Communist rhetoric, intimidating and militant, once again became
popular among party chiefs and village ofﬁcials who got to work immediately. In May
1928 at a closed meeting of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, Balyts’kyi alerted the
party about the increasing danger emanating from the periphery, and the Ukrainian
party leadership was ordered to intensify surveillance in the countryside and to broadly
employ repression against the rebels.71 They were deﬁned in class and national terms,
‘‘kurkuli’’ and ‘‘petliurovtsi’’ (‘‘Petliurites’’), and were criminalized using a broader deﬁni-
tion, ‘‘spekulianty.’’72
The crushing of the ‘‘left opposition’’ in late 1928 meant not only a personal victory
for Stalin that boosted his popularity in the party but was also a vital necessity for the
regime to continue. Precisely during this time, the hands of the secret police were untied:
special operations and the arrest of members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations and
groups followed one after another.73 The extraordinary measures and their direct result,
starvation, guaranteed the peasants’ long-term hostility toward the authorities.
By late 1928, the peasants began to organize: passive peasant resistance was trans-
formed into open protests, terrorist attacks, mass disturbances, and armed riots. The
majority craved self-governing and called for action to get rid of the Bolsheviks. Stalin
kept insisting that only an insigniﬁcant section of the Ukrainian peasantry, kurkuli,
caused trouble in the villages, a line for domestic and foreign consumption.74 He,
however, was informed by the GPU that the opposite was true. The entire Ukrainian
countryside was in turmoil. According to Liudmyla Hrynevych’s calculations, Stalin
could rely only on 5% of Ukrainian society who could be characterized (and only con-
ditionally) as a conscious pro-Soviet group of people.75 Therefore, the extraordinary
measures were essentially the only solution to the crisis, a solution he kept promoting
vigorously.
Their implementation became possible because of the formation of a new Politburo
under Stalin’s management. By early-mid 1929 the ‘‘right’’ opposition was conquered,
and Stalin’s command-repressive system was installed. By late 1929 to early 1930, as one
scholar has stated, the ‘‘entire Politburo became a sort of Stalin faction.’’76 This shaped
the second wave of terror in the countryside during the ﬁrst months of 1929, which
was even more severe.77
In April 1929, Stalin advised the local party cells to press the kurkul. His thesis
about the mobilization of the poorest Ukrainian peasantry against kurkuli was reﬂected
in his speech delivered at the April 1929 Joint Plenum of the TsK and TsKK VKP(b).
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Shortly thereafter, the Ukrainian party leader Stanislav Kosior reported that in 22
okruhy (out of 40) 18,000 kurkul households were auctioned off or conﬁscated as
punishment for hoarding grain. The kurkuli were found guilty of sabotage, and were
sentenced to one year in prison. Their personal property was also conﬁscated. Violence
and the prohibition of the free grain market produced hunger and mass exodus from
the villages.78 In autumn of 1929, 15,000 more peasant households were destroyed
(de-kurkulized).79
Although the GPU systematically conﬁscated ﬁrearms left over from the Civil War
from the peasantry, political activism among the peasants was growing. In Kirovohrad
oblast, for instance, Serhii Bilenko and Davyd Baden, residents of the village of
Pishchanyi Brid (Novoukrains’kyi raion or district), organized meetings to sabotage
grain procurements, arguing that Soviet power choked them by unbearable taxes and
took all their bread.80 They were arrested by the GPU on 3 April 1929 for anti-Soviet
propaganda, and exiled to the North for three years. Ivan Hruznyts’kyi, Mykhailo
Todorenko, and the Vovchenko family (Pavlo, Semen, and Taras) of the village of
Novomykolaiivka (Novoukrains’kyi district) called for disobedience to free Ukraine.
Taras organized a protest against the representatives of sil’rada, demanding they cease
populating his land with migrants, and Ivan called for change of the regime. All were
arrested on 20 September 1929. Pavlo and Semen were sentenced to three years, Taras
and Mykhailo to ﬁve years, and Ivan to 10 years in concentration camps.81 The protests
in the village Haiivka (Zinov’ivs’kyi district) resulted in the arrest of several individuals.
Among them were Hurii Hraliuk who openly identiﬁed Soviet leaders as a group of
criminals who should not lead the country, Fedot Smykodub who systematically con-
ducted anti-Soviet propaganda and refused to pay taxes, and Andrii Katerynych who
argued that the Communists intended to use starvation as a weapon against the
peasants.82 They were arrested on 15 January 1929 and sentenced to three years in exile
in the North.
Moreover, environmental factors, such as bad crop in 1928–1929 (nedorid) in
Southern Ukraine, and Soviet plans to procure as much bread, meat, eggs, butter, and
other foodstuffs as possible to supply non-Ukrainian regions exhausted the Ukrainian
peasants’ households:83 from mid-1928, they began to starve, exhibiting symptoms of
serious malnourishment, such as swelling. By early 1929, the famine affected thousands
of people in Ukraine. For instance, according to the February 1929 reports of the secret
organs, in the village of Derezovatsi (Dnipropetrovs’ka okruha) alone, 50 households were
systematically starving, and in eight villages of Kutsevolivs’kyi district (Kirovohrads’ka
okruha) 1,963 children and 3,793 adults out of 35,640 residents suffered from hunger.84
April and May of 1929 were especially difﬁcult months for the peasants, when their
winter reserves were gone. The GPU informed the center about mass starvation in
the villages, and the discrepancy between state aid and people’s needs.85 According to
Hrynevych, during the famine of 1928–1929 the direct demographic losses of Ukraine’s
population constituted approximately 23,000 people, and indirect losses of approxi-
mately 80,000 people.86 Whether the Soviet leadership used the famine of 1928–1929
as an effective weapon against peasant protests is a matter for conjecture. However,
the idea clearly has some currency, since the Bolsheviks had a ‘‘formative experience’’
in crushing the resistance of kurkuli in the Ukrainian countryside in 1919–1920. The
violence of collectivization in 1919–1920 and people’s starvation in 1921 remained
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part of their horrible memories about the regime.87 One scholar has noted that the
famine of 1921–1922 had certainly ‘‘opened up new possibilities for the Bolsheviks.’’88
Importantly, because of the famine, the hostility toward Soviet power became
pandemic. Neither the rotation of the party leadership in Ukrainian villages, nor the
March 1928 GPU operation which resulted in the arrest of 400 party functionaries,
alleviated the political crisis in the republic.89 The exponential growth of anti-Soviet
peasant revolts during the second part of 1929 provoked the government to consider
more severe punishments for the most active and recalcitrant individuals who openly
called for resistance. The death penalty became a more common sentence.90 The December
1929 directive of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) was very clear about this group
of people and identiﬁed them as counterrevolutionary activists (kontrrevoliutsiinyi
aktyv).91 Their cases were ‘‘investigated’’ by OGPU troikas, and the luckiest were
sentenced to 10 years in exile. In the late 1920s, 850,000 Ukrainian peasants were exiled
to the uninhabited regions of the Kola Peninsula and Siberia. Although Moscow relied
on Ukrainian GPU resources in implementing this operation (the liquidation of
kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv), the deputy head of the counterintelligence department of the
OGPU of the USSR S. V. Puzyts’kyi thoroughly supervised the logistics of the opera-
tion.92 By late 1930, at a Union level, 20,201 people were executed by the GPU for
participating in mass disturbances.93
The ‘‘nationalist’’ proﬁle of the kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv in Ukraine, shaped by the
rhetoric of the campaign against kurkuli and Ukrainian nationalists which was launched
by the center and masterminded by the secret police, exacerbated their guilt before the
state. Through ofﬁcial and non-ofﬁcial channels, the rhetoric of verdicts and news-
paper articles overlapped and enriched one another, and kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv and
instigators of political unrest in the countryside were identiﬁed in nationalist terms—
Petliurites. For instance, Moisei Ivanets’ of the village of Skaleva (Novoarkhanhels’kyi
district), who inspired his neighbors to rebel against the authorities, was one of them.
He was arrested on 19 November 1929 and after a brief investigation he was accused of
close connections to Petlurites, identiﬁed as a nationalist and a Petlurite, and shot on 27
February 1930.94 In GPU individual and group criminal ﬁles, three terms are blended—
kurkuli, political gangs, and nationalists. Interrogators employed them together, sepa-
rately, and interchangeably. For instance, in villages like Skaleva, ‘‘political gangs of
nationalists’’ under the leadership of locals Zalizniak and Lysovenko recruited new
members, agitated against Soviet power, and distributed anti-Soviet propaganda leaﬂets.
Petro Riabuha and Davyd Sidun, residents of Skaleva, were arrested on 21 November
1929 and were shot on the same day with Ivanets’ in February 1930.95 The village of
Tsybuleve (Ielysavethradkivs’kyi district) had its own share of nationalists and kurkuli
who were sentenced to death.96
In 1929, the peasants resisted the Soviet regime’s violence and coercion individually
and in groups, using various tactics. Among others were clandestine activities, such
as arson of the Soviet activists’ properties and distribution of anti-Soviet propaganda
leaﬂets that called for resistance to collectivization;97 open verbal attacks against the
village authorities; and mass disturbances and violent beatings and murders of Soviet
activists. For instance in the village Velyki Babtsi under the leadership of Starikov,
the villagers armed themselves with stones, sticks, and pitchforks, and chased the Soviet
village administration and militia out of the village. The ﬁght lasted 10 hours, and 1500
people participated in the riot. Soviet power in the village ceased to exist for a day but
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was restored when an armed militia detachment was sent to the village.98 Local militia
men were vulnerable and complained to Kharkiv authorities that they could not control
the situation, and they demanded to be provided with the sufﬁcient amount of guns,
ammunition, and incentives, similar to that of the Red Army soldiers.99
From Lynne Viola’s studies of peasant resistance, we learned that women were an
inseparable part of peasant riots.100 The children’s participation in riots and attacks
against village authorities was also prominent, and may be welcomed as a new avenue
of research on violence in the Ukrainian countryside during Stalin’s collectivization
campaign. For instance, in the village Pavlivka (Kharkivs’ka okruha), children system-
atically participated in clashes with the local authorities. Women attacked the wives of
the village administration and encouraged their children to beat them severely.101 In
April 1929 the GPU arrested a group of individuals for anti-Soviet propaganda from
the Karl Marx commune (Pervomais’ka okruha) whose inﬂuence spread far beyond
their commune.102 Among those who actively participated in the group’s activities
were children. Moreover, children’s bravery and political activism extended beyond
their participation in riots and mass disturbances. They wrote letters to Stalin about
their hardships in despair and doom.103
In the midst of cleansing GPU operations that eliminated kurkuli and nationalists
in the Ukrainian countryside, Moscow never gave up on propaganda methods.104 The
propagandists dug out Lenin’s article ‘‘How should one organize a competition?’’ that
he wrote in 1918 in which he explicated his idea about socialist competition and
the creativity of the masses helping the state build a strong and resilient economy. The
time was right to remind the peasants about their duty to be part of socialist construc-
tion and to prove self-conscious and long-standing commitment to the revolution. The
article was published on 20 January 1929 in Pravda, detailing an array of party direc-
tives about who should compete with whom and why. The urban regions adopted the
innovation ﬁrst. Now it was time for the countryside to be included in the all-Union
movement of socialist competition.
In July 1929, when Ukrainian rural regions were in turmoil, Moscow ordered the
Ukrainian authorities to sign an agreement about ‘‘agricultural’’ socialist competition
(sotszmahannia) among Moscow, Kharkiv, and the Don region to distract and to pacify
the peasantry. The authorities enthusiastically supported the idea and such an agree-
ment was signed. However, the center’s plans were not working very well. Most peasants
were skeptical about Moscow’s promises about sotszmahannia that would allegedly
facilitate the fulﬁllment of the Five-Year Plan and ultimately deliver prosperity to each
household. Those who saw through the center’s propaganda maneuver were rather
vocal: ‘‘Ukraine sold itself out to Moscow; the agreement about sotszmahannia is a new
type of slavery.’’105 In August 1929, Russian propagandists, Moscow plenipotentiaries in
Kharkiv, and local party bosses came up with a directive which denounced this kurkul
interpretation of sotszmahannia and ordered the rural party organs to popularize the
agreement in villages by allocating several hours per week for studying its text and
educating the peasants in the socialist spirit. Each village council was supposed to dis-
play the text of the agreement about sotszmahannia at the council’s headquarters near
another important document, the Constitution of the USRR.106 People’s participation
in the competition was mandatory, and a lack of enthusiasm, let alone their refusal to
compete, was punishable by exile. The gap between Lenin’s suggestion about people’s
self-conscious and voluntary participation in competition, its premises and objectives,
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and state practices of coercion and violence further aggravated the starving men and
women. These realities made Stalin realize that the Ukrainian peasants were a politi-
cally dangerous phenomenon, more dangerous than their counterparts in the Russian
Federation.107
According to the ofﬁcial data, over the course of 1927–1928, 538 terrorist acts were
registered in Ukrainian villages. In 1928–1929 this number more than doubled to 1266,
and from 1927 to 1929, 318 representatives of Soviet power in villages were attacked
and murdered.108 In late 1929 to early 1930, the Ukrainian GPU managed to establish
control over eight okruhy, Poltavs’ka, Iziums’ka, Kharkivs’ka, Sums’ka, Proskurivs’ka,
Kam’ianets’ka, Odes’ka, and AMRSR, although mass bab’i bunty still erupted in
Shepetivka, Starobils’k, and Kup’ians’k.109 By October 1929, the GPU had arrested
3,705 individuals in Ukraine.110 However, the riots continued to grow in 1929 and
reached their peak in 1930.111 They absorbed four large okruha, Kyiv’ska, Bilotserkivs’ka,
Mohyliov-Podils’ka, and Vinnyts’ka. Karl Karlson reported that from 1 March to 15
March 1930, the GPU arrested 25,000 people, liquidated 36 counterrevolutionary organ-
izations and 256 counterrevolutionary groups, shot 655 individuals, sent 3,673 men to
concentration camps, and exiled 5,580 people. In total, the operation resulted in the
displacement of 88,656 peasants and the next goal, according to Karlson, was to cleanse
Ukraine’s near-border territories by exiling 15,000 people.112
This discussion of the events of 1928–1929 in Ukraine provides us with the foun-
dation for a more careful understanding of the reasons behind advancing the politics of
silence in Ukraine. A close analysis of Circular no. 984, issued by the Narkomindel in
Moscow at the dawn of the collectivization campaign, will help establish the connection
between Soviet politics of silence, state violence, and its intentionality.
1928: Institutionalizing the Politics of Silence
Cultural or symbolic violence creates a situation when domination is ‘‘soft’’ and ‘‘in-
visible,’’ and is a constant, effective and, perhaps, more brutal means of oppression
than direct violence, as Pierre Bourdieu has posited.113 It isolates people and makes
them a part of the ‘‘secret’’ space of a lie, subversion, and cynicism, masked as a space
of freedom and justice. Subversion and cynicism can achieve both the invigoration of
political resistance and the destruction of beliefs and hopes. In Ukraine in 1928–1929,
besides direct violence, the demarcation of rebellious villages was achieved through
information blockades and deception. To a potential foreign observer, the brutality of
Soviet collectivization would present a drastic departure from the noble goals and
credos of socialism proclaimed by the Bolsheviks. Therefore, routine cover-ups of the
discrepancy between the words and the deeds of the regime became an essential and
inseparable part of power politics, and secrecy was an operative mode prescribed by
the party and controlled by the Soviet secret police.114
Foreign journalists were carefully managed on Soviet soil.115 They were obliged to
inform the authorities about their travel plans in advance, so that they were thoroughly
monitored by the secret police in the territory of the USSR. Secret agents followed
foreigners like shadows, as a worker of the VOKS (the All-Union Society for Cultural
Ties Abroad) suggested.116 Moscow’s fundamental task was to show foreigners ‘‘model
institutions,’’ which would create a favorable view about the Soviet experiment.117 This
selectiveness provided an opportunity to strengthen existing sympathies toward the
Soviet state among Sovietophiles, and to convert the critics of the socialist system into
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supporters.118 For foreign travelers, a necessary precondition for their pleasant trip and
safe return home was public praising of Soviet approaches and policies.119
From late 1928, despite massive anti-kurkul propaganda, it became increasingly
difﬁcult to ﬁnd model collective farms and to conceal social unrest in villages because
there was a true war in the Ukrainian countryside.120 The party leadership urgently de-
cided to take precautions to make the conﬂict and its consequences invisible for for-
eigners, obstructing their desire to travel to the Ukrainian countryside.
In December 1928 the head of the Kharkiv Okruha Executive Committee, Panas
Butsenko, received Circular no. 984 from the Narkomindel instructing the local author-
ities in Kharkiv to prevent foreigners’ trips to the countryside.121 The Circular was
directed exclusively to Ukraine and was deﬁned as ‘‘strictly secret’’ (tsilkom taiemno),
reinforcing the sense of the seriousness of conspiratorial matters among local party
bureaucracy, especially regarding collectivization in Ukraine that went far from
smoothly.122 Importantly, only eight copies of the Circular were issued. Identifying the
other seven recipients of the Circular appears problematic. Likely, they were heads of
okruhy executive committees in other large industrial and cultural centers in Ukraine,
such as Kyiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, Donets’k, Odesa or others, where visits of foreign
journalists would be most probable. What is certain is that, as a key player in monitor-
ing foreigners in Ukraine, the Kharkiv GPU should also have received a copy of this
document.
It appears Narkomindel ofﬁcials created the text of the Circular. However, it is
possible that this was a collective effort of diplomats and top-ranking party members.
In the late 1920s, the Narkomindel had little autonomy and was fully subordinate
to high party organs’ decisions. Rikke Haute has argued that ‘‘the political leadership
formulated foreign policy strategy independently of the Narkomindel and could at
any point, where they found it appropriate, interfere in the concrete decision-making
process within the Narkomindel.’’123
Moreover, the Narkomindel received special secret instructions about the secrecy
of all information that originated within the Politburo and went through the Narkomindel.
Its ﬁrst Commissar, Georgy Chicherin, was advised that the content of any foreign policy
discussions held by any high party organs, such as the Central Committee, the Politburo,
or the Organizational Bureau, should not be revealed even to the Narkomindel’s own
board, the Collegium. The procedure of voting and stenographic reports about the
meetings held in the Narkomindel and party organs (separate and joint), reports from
which it was clear ‘‘who said what,’’ had to be classiﬁed, and access to these materials was
to be extremely limited.124 Chicherin and his deputy Maxim Litvinov were personally re-
sponsible for potential information leaks to unauthorized individuals or agencies, and
they knew perfectly well what sort of sanctions would be applied to them for any failure
to protect sensitive information from ‘‘foreign’’ eyes.125 Not surprisingly, the document
in question contains no references to the corresponding directives of the leading party
organs.
The stenographic minutes of the meetings of the Politburo and the Central Com-
mittee typically revealed ‘‘the truth about who really took the initiative and pulled
the strings.’’126 This information was top secret, especially when a new party directive
contradicted ofﬁcial legislation. As early as 1921, the Politburo advised all People’s
Commissariats and the secret police to avoid mentioning previous secret party resolu-
tions in their documents. The avoidance of such references in Circular no. 984 created
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an illusion that the Politburo had little to do with it, and that the document was the
product of the Narkomindel.
Keep in mind that by late 1928, Stalin manipulated most major decisions, although
the pretense of the collective decision-making process was intact. As some scholars
have argued, the term ‘‘discussions’’ that occurred at the high party level would be an
over-exaggeration. Archival evidence indicates that even individuals who constituted
Stalin’s inner circle within the Politburo, which originally consisted of the ‘‘group of
six’’ (Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov, and Zhdanov), did not equally con-
tribute to discussions of foreign policies. Rather, most were listeners who ‘‘were simply
kept informed.’’127
Nor were Ukrainian party leaders active participants in discussions about foreign
policies that directly concerned Ukraine.128 Khrystyian Rakovs’kyi who simultaneously
headed the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Council of People’s Commissars
in Ukraine was extremely busy and largely disengaged in foreign affairs. Moreover,
Moscow took measures to limit Ukrainian diplomatic representation abroad, and by
1922, Ukraine was diplomatically represented only in Germany and Poland. The chief
leadership in foreign affairs was implemented in the center, Moscow. Soviet diplomat
Grigory Bessedovsky noted that ‘‘the Ukrainian Commissariat [could] undertake nothing
without previous assent from Moscow.’’129 On 6 July 1923, Moscow ofﬁcially created
the Narkomindel, and its Ukrainian satellite was abolished. The Narkomindel became one
of the most important Soviet propaganda agencies, functioning also as an intelligence-
gathering agency.130
Subsequently, the structural and interpersonal speciﬁcity associated with the
Narkomindel and the Politburo permits a reasonably secure conclusion that the Politburo
‘‘supervised’’ the creation of the Circular for Ukraine. The Narkomindel, however,
managed the surveillance logistics and procedures of preventing foreigners from travel-
ing to Ukraine who might witness the conﬂict and realize that the integrity of the USSR
was threatened.131
The text of the Circular seems to have been shaped by the Narkomindel’s and the
GPU’s understanding that there were two possible scenarios for dealing with this
matter: ﬁrst, to deny an entrance visa to as many visitors as possible; and second, if
the visa to the USSR was granted, and a foreigner wanted to visit Ukrainian villages,
the local authorities would make it impossible for a foreigner to travel there. Despite
uneasy and competing relations between the Narkomindel and the secret police,132 the
two agencies had to cooperate to implement these tasks. The individual personal and
professional characteristics of a visitor mattered, hence the Narkomindel, assisted by
the secret police and the VOKS, took the lead in gathering relevant information about
those who applied for Soviet visas.133
The risk of exposing Ukrainian villages in disarray was too great. The exposure of
coercion and subversion to a foreign eye would undermine the image of the Soviet state
as a state of justice and equality, and might provoke a foreign invasion, a fear which
the Kremlin constantly instigated and reinforced.134 On 11 December 1928, Fiodor
Rotshtein, a member of the Collegium of the Narkomindel and the head of its Press
Bureau that was responsible for shaping international attitudes toward Soviet develop-
ments, issued ofﬁcial secret instruction no. 4860 about foreign visitors and their trips to
the countryside. Rotshtein’s instruction was sent to the Kharkiv Executive Committee
and was registered as Circular no. 984.135 It restricted foreigners’ mobility in Ukraine,
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and ordered the local authorities to inform the secret police about the movements of
foreign journalists within the republic.
Rotshtein’s instruction appears to be the result of intensive analytical work conducted
by the secret police and the Narkomindel. By late 1926, the Informational Operational
Department of the Ukrainian GPU provided the Narkomindel with a comprehensive
report about the deplorable situation in Ukrainian villages. Within a year, the secret
police had been gathering information about the peasants’ moods, their attitudes toward
Soviet power, and their political activism and participation in mass disturbances.136 Im-
portantly, secret agents emphasized that there was discontent with Soviet policies
among all social strata, including the poor peasantry. The peasants agitated to obtain
weapons to resist the Bolsheviks’ robbery. Hardships and dissatisfaction with the state,
the report claimed, produced mass alcoholism and banditry in the villages: the peasants
were depressed, demoralized, and aggressive.137 As discussed earlier, within a year the
situation escalated. Stalin was very well informed about it. From autumn 1929 to spring
1930, he received 50,000 letters of complaint from the peasants; Mikhail Kalinin, head
of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, received approximately 85,000 letters
of complaint.138 The measures undertaken by Moscow were supposed to create a dome
of silence over these realities. Rotshtein’s Circular seemed a necessary step for the state
to isolate the Ukrainian countryside from foreign attention.
Interestingly, the document, however, did not disclose the rationale for preventing
foreign journalists from traveling to Ukrainian villages. The reason behind this was
purely pragmatic and consistent with routine practices of the Narkomindel and the
Politburo. Analyzing the decision-making process in the Soviet Union, Russian scholar
Irina V. Pavlova has perceptively noted:
[The] concealment of motive was entirely deliberate. Party and state ofﬁcials acted in
accordance with a Politburo decision dated 12 April 1923, the gist of which was that
‘‘in laying extraordinarily secret matters before the Politburo, the People’s Commissariats
(the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Commissariat of Military Affairs, the OGPU
and others) should not give reasons for their proposals in writings, but introduce their
recommendations through preliminary conﬁdential agreement (sgovor) with the Central
Committee Secretariat.139
Instead, the Circular camouﬂaged the true reasons behind the restrictions of foreigners’
movements in Ukraine by expressing concerns about the safety of foreigners who might
secretly travel to villages. The Narkomindel claimed that in cases when foreigners failed
to inform the GPU about the itinerary of their trips, it would be impossible for the state
to protect them against potential dangers in the countryside, and that travelers had to
bear full responsibility for their poor decision.140
The Circular also condemned the extraordinarily lavish treatment that foreign
journalists received from the Soviet authorities in the localities. Travelers were usually
provided with a car, were invited to give press conferences, and attend banquets
arranged by the local party elite. In the Narkomindel’s view, local party leaders engaged
in sycophantic and ingratiating behavior, ‘‘damaging state prestige.’’ Moscow ofﬁcials
assured their Kharkiv counterparts that foreign citizens were certainly not treated like
royalty in their own ‘‘capitalist country.’’141 Hence, the Kharkiv authorities were in-
structed to stop these shameful ostentatious displays unworthy of Communists.
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Quite cynically, the Narkomindel warned the local Soviet and party organs in
Kharkiv that they would bear full responsibility for any failure to monitor foreigners’
movements in Ukraine. In other words, Moscow granted visas but Kharkiv was respon-
sible for approving the candidates for visas and for not allowing these guests to travel to
the zones of conﬂicts. Point 2 of the Circular stipulated that the Narkomindel would
provide the details about the pending trip of a foreign journalist, and if the Kharkiv
Okrvykonkom was interested in this trip and approved its itinerary, it should inform
the Narkomindel and the GPU accordingly. Ultimately, this obfuscated the initial re-
sponsibility of the Narkomindel to make the ﬁnal decision about granting permission
to a foreigner to travel to Ukraine. The center considered the potential ‘‘disloyalty’’ of
a foreign journalist a local responsibility with appropriate punitive measures aimed at
punishing local party and Soviet agencies’ bosses for their political shortsightedness.142
Moscow ofﬁcials’ attempt at protecting their positions and masking the real reasons
behind the Circular were not simply the concealment of the realities, but it reﬂects
the very essence of the politics of silence: deception, manipulation, distortion, and
non-accountability which help change reality into another kind of reality for ‘‘brutal
claims to power.’’143
Signiﬁcantly, December 1928, when the Circular was issued, marked an important
transitional period between collective leadership and personalized leadership in the
Politburo. The principle of collective leadership rejected authoritarian decisions, but at
the same time obscured the individual responsibility of high party ofﬁcials. Prior to
early 1928, Stalin ‘‘appeared as the epitome of collective leadership,’’ and he was
extremely cautious in afﬁrming his authoritarian position.144 Yet after April 1929,
when the ‘‘right opposition’’ was defeated, Stalin strengthened his position and his
circle made attempts at erecting Stalin’s cult. The consolidation of his position required
the reduction of his personal responsibility for the most crucial decisions, and Stalin
strategically designed several approaches to delegate this responsibility to other indi-
viduals or agencies, often in localities. Preserving the illusion of the collective principle,
Stalin was able to put blame on local party leaders for the failures of his policies, or to
reward them in case they managed to successfully implement them.145 The symptoms
of this conceptual arrangement are evident in the Narkomindel document.146
As noted earlier, the secret police played a crucial role in handling ‘‘unreliable’’
foreigners who wanted to see for themselves whether the state employed starvation as
a tool to tame peasant resistance. The Circular is very speciﬁc about what was to be
done in a situation when a trip by foreign visitors ‘‘was undesirable’’ for the Soviet state
but inevitable because the Narkomindel granted them a visa. Moscow advised the
Kharkiv Okrvykonkom to limit contacts to a bare minimum with those individuals
who were not willing to inform the local authorities about their intentions. Moreover,
the Circular instructed Kharkiv to obstruct visitors’ attempts to obtain any information
about local developments. Any assistance in organizing their trips to border regions,
factories, and villages was strictly forbidden.147 The Okrvykonkom was supposed to
transfer the responsibility for visitors in this category to the local departments of the
GPU.148
Unquestionably, the Politburo tried to prevent interventions from the West in
the political and economic campaigns of 1927–1928 when the procurement of grain
became one of the most important tasks for the regime to support its industrialization,
and to keep internal problems secret. This period was characterized by heightened
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internal security, justiﬁed because of the threat of war, and the demand for building a
powerful defense industry. From mid-1927, the various people’s commissariats labored
to facilitate the process of constructing an efﬁcient Soviet military economy. The mobi-
lization of the population was constantly fed by the fear of war, intentionally escalated
by the government, and any external intrusion in the anatomy of the scheme had to be
prevented. Ultimately, the chief responsibility of the Narkomindel and the GPU was to
maintain the myth about the ﬁrst successful socialist egalitarian society by preventing
truthful journalist accounts that could reach the international community and to keep
the Soviet scheme secret.
The 1928 Statute about Secrecy, signed by the head of the OGPU Special Depart-
ment, Gleb Bokii,149 was designed to accomplish exactly that, and reﬂects the intensity
of discussions about foreigners at the highest level in 1928 when the politics of silence
became instrumental to the success of collectivization and the concealment of its
unavoidable ‘‘side effects.’’ Interestingly enough, this document has a speciﬁc point
of reference to foreign visitors, which places the Statute and the Circular in the same
conspiratorial and political contexts. For instance, point 8 of the Statute (Section III
‘‘Political and Procedural Questions,’’ sub-section ‘‘Top Secret’’) emphasized that any
secret documents or inter-institutional correspondence about foreigners who resided
in the territory of the USSR, and speciﬁcally about their possible arrest, deportation,
or exchange for Soviet citizens, had to be strictly secret which meant that access to
these documents had to be limited to persons directly involved in these affairs.150
Clearly, the OGPU neither excluded the worst case scenario, the arrest of a foreigner
who violated the code of ‘‘appropriate’’ behavior in the territory of the USSR, nor was
reluctant to apply the strictest measures to a foreign citizen under one condition: the
information about the incident should be classiﬁed.
Signiﬁcantly, the time when the OGPU Statute was revised and approved by the
Politburo (early January 1929), and when Circular no. 984 was issued (late December
1928) dovetails neatly with the time when the state advanced the brutal system of bread
procurements that lasted until late 1932. Most importantly, the state displayed an
amazing ability to keep its general populace and the international community in the
dark for quite some time about the Kremlin’s policies that devastated Ukrainian
villages. As Rosenfeldt has posited, ‘‘as the system was constructed, there was certainly
no possibility that the ‘disclosed secrets’ could circulate freely in the bureaucracy or
among the population as a whole.’’151 The Central Committee and Stalin personally
relished secrecy, and their entire production was built on the basis of written and
unwritten statutes about secrecy and conspiratorial practices, which cloaked the conse-
quences of the Soviets’ governing.
Conclusion
The Soviet politics of silence constituted an invisible and ‘‘unperceived form’’ of cultural
violence, or what Pierre Bourdieu and Slavoj Zizek identiﬁed as symbolic or systemic
violence, which prepared the foundation for the direct violence of 1932–1933.152 Scholars
of Genocide Studies and the Holodomor have been familiar with the concept for quite
some time: it is now common knowledge that the Soviets attempted to conceal the
information of the brutalities associated with the collectivization campaign in Ukraine.
Yet documents, such as Circular no. 984, that would explicitly outline the course of
action that would prevent foreigners from observing mass disturbances, riots, and the
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famine of 1928–1929 in the Ukrainian countryside have been discovered for the ﬁrst
time. The tangible evidence of concealment, a practice that the Kremlin used in Uk-
raine in 1928–1929, reveals the intentionality of actions that were inconsistent with
the lofty humanistic rhetoric of the Soviet regime and its ideology of egalitarianism.153
Indeed, the Marxist-Leninist ideology imposed constraints on the Soviet govern-
ment: systematic coercion, violence, and mass killings could undermine the Bolsheviks’
claim to be legitimate followers of Marx and Lenin for Westerners and for insiders. The
state’s effort was focused on ‘‘the manipulation, adaptation, and selective interpretation
of the ideological heritage,’’154 which helped the center conceal doubtful practical appli-
cations of Marxism to avoid negative publicity, especially in the West. In the context of
what happened after 1928–1929 in Ukraine—the Soviet genocide of 1932–1933—the
Circular permits us to better understand the destructive capabilities of silence. The
bond of the peasantry with the proletariat and its dictatorship that Stalin proclaimed
in 1926 was not only disadvantageous but also deadly for millions of people in Ukraine,
as subsequent events have demonstrated, and its consequences were hidden for quite
some time.
The politics of silence strategically demarcated and isolated Ukrainian villages from
the proper attention of their fellow citizens in the Union and internationally. Silence
was an effective political strategy that made resistance and political mobilization difﬁ-
cult, but made it possible to identify and personalize the ‘‘transgression.’’155 More pro-
foundly, silence and the relatively hermetic information blockade created a space for
direct state violence that crushed the subsequent, more numerous and large-scale,
peasant rebellions in 1930–1931, producing a ghetto of exclusion. Cloaked by silence,
this opaque space did not simply exclude and isolate people’s experiences and suffering
from the rest of society, it fundamentally negated their existence, ‘‘making them in-
admissible for consideration.’’156 In this landscape, people’s experiences became a public
secret that muddied the truthful record about their disobedience and resistance, and the
state’s violent attempts to suppress them. Using August Comte’s term, in a ‘‘conspiracy of
silence,’’ coercion and starvation were used as political tools, and strategic silence helped
maintain the ﬁctitious narrative about the successes of socialist construction promoted
by Soviet propaganda. 157
Domestically, talk about the famine and state terror was criminalized, and the actual
tragedy of Ukrainian peasants fell into a catacomb of myths and rumors. In addition,
documents, such as Circular no. 984, cultivated xenophobia among local party bosses
and shaped their attitudes toward foreigners as potential enemies. These attitudes
migrated into the public sphere, instigating popular suspicion of foreigners and generat-
ing people’s commitment to follow instructions from above which were based on de-
ception and sham. Moscow’s expectations were informed by hope that the conspiracy
of silence would become for Ukrainians as natural and habitual as their xenophobia.
Although over the last decade thousands of documents have been discovered that
unequivocally demonstrated the center’s conscious nature of repressive and extra-
ordinary measures in Ukraine, top secret Circular no. 984 best reﬂects its intention
to implement and to hide the terror to which Ukrainian peasants were subjected in
1928–1929. Importantly, recent scholarly studies have provided grounds to suggest
that Soviet authorities attempted to conceal more than the famine and state violence.
They attempted to camouﬂage the political and economic subversion of Ukraine, the
Ukrainians’ anti-Soviet and anti-colonial attitudes toward the state, and the inevitable
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ethnic changes, resulting from routine national operations in this geographical region.158
The plan was designed to exceed the political course attempted in the early 1920s to
win Ukraine and to transform it into a solid and long-lasting source of cash for indus-
trialization. Ukraine, as a frontier region southeastward and as a granary of the Soviet
Union, had to bear the burdens of increasing political and military centralization, and
had to serve the Soviet political system as an economic support of its power. Silence
became a strategic technique that helped achieve this goal.
In the Gulag (Vorkuta), Panas Butsenko, the recipient of Circular no. 984, rumi-
nated about the total political and economic subversion of Ukraine in the 1930s:
The reason is in ourselves. We lost the battle. We turned out to be mediocre politicians.
We failed to guarantee safety to our nation . . . . We perceived false assurances of friend-
ship as a reality. We were satisﬁed by power without power . . . . We did not defend our-
selves. We voluntarily entered the mouth of a boa . . . . Perhaps, a new clever generation
will come after us. It won’t repeat our mistakes.159
The ‘‘boa’’ swallowed millions of the Ukrainian peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the
clergy, without the possibility of restoring its initial ethnographic and cultural reserves.
Only after the collapse of the USSR and subsequent new archival ﬁndings, have his-
torians begun to realize the scale of this catastrophe.
From the inception of the USSR to its very end, Soviet national, social, cultural and
economic policies were shielded by the politics of silence which helped obscure their
essence and consequences. These policies were an array of crimes against humanity at
many levels. As mentioned earlier, deﬁnitions are important, although they are not
inclusive and never fully explain a phenomenon. The incredibly large number of
the regime’s victims, coupled with state violence and brutality, magnify its intrinsic
inhumane nature and place Soviet collectivization policies and their direct consequences,
such as famines, mass killings, and exile, squarely in the category of crimes against
humanity.
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